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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JUDGES GARFF, JACKSON, and ORME
The Plaintiff-Appellant, City of St. George, by and through
counsel, T. W. Shumway, submits the following brief in support of
its petition for review of the judgment of the Utah Court of
Appeals in this case.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
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^1D THE APPELLATE COURT ERR IN FIMPLAINTIFF-APPELLEE TURNER DO NOT EXCi^^ rum J. nun x i u ^ u u v ^ u
OF OBSCENITY A S A MATTER OF LAW?
ADc.i I i.('.',?!"' I I"Hi Mi f,ui,-.i Miller *"''• '• • rr'.vient interest.
Application of the Miller tesL:

2.

patently offensive.

DID THE APPELLATE COURT INCORRECTLY DENY APPLICATION OF THE
LOCAL COMMUNITY STANDARD IN EVALUATION OF THE TURNER
MATERIAL FOR OBSCENITY?

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
provides, in relevant part, that:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for redress of grievances."
Article I,

Sec. 15, of the Utah Constitution provides, in

relevant part, that:
"No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom
of speech or of the press . . . "
St. George City Ordinance No. 2-77-2 provides, in relevant
part, that:
"a.

"Obscene is a word descriptive of any material or
performance which, when taken as a whole and considered
in the context of the contemporary standards of this
community:
1.
2.
3.

*

*

Appeals to the prurient interest in sex;
Portrays sexual conduct in a patently offensive
manner;
Has no serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value.

*

e.

"Sexual conduct" includes any of the following described
forms of sexual conduct if depicted or described in a
patently offensive way:

(2)

Masturbation, excretion, excretory functions or lewd
exhibition of the genitals, including any explicit
close-up representation of a human genital organ or a
spread-egale exposure of female genital organs."
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and expression.
minimum

When does such an infringement occur?

standards of obscenity are not met.

When

See Miller v.

California (1973), 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419. A
consideration of those minimum standards and how they relate to
Turner's wall decor is necessary in order ro evaluate whether zhe
action of the trial judge and the verdict of the jury were proper.
This appeal argues that the decision in the trial court adequately
safeguarded Turner's constitutional rights of free expression while
finding two of the works in his shop to be obscene under the St.
George ordinance.
The two prongs of the Miller test of major concern to the
appellate court will be referred to as the "prurient interest" test
and the "patently offensive" test, both appropriate matters for
jury determination.

The Turner renderings, of course, may fall

short of what might be considered obscene in larger cities, but the
community standards in St. George are at the same time considerably
more conservative than those in larger urban areas, and the legal
thresholds with which the court must be concerned were sufficiently
met to allow the jury to determine obscenity as a matter of fact.
Prurient interest and patent offensiveness are appropriate issues
for review by an appellate court, but the primary issue remains
that point at which constitutional concerns are satisfied as a
legal matter and a community is free to apply its local standard to
facts that exceed a minimum but are still in question.
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B. Taken as a Whole. Is the prurient interest created by the
two

offending

depictions

diluted

by

inclusion

in

a

collage

dominated by other themes so as to make them non-obscene?

This

could be the case if they are clearly part of the totality of a
larger unit and not readily divisible therefrom so as to constitute
"a whole" by themselves.

However, it is erroneous to read Miller

as requiring that we view the bed sheets "as a whole";

obscenity

can be intermingled with protected speech without losing its
obscene nature, and in appropriate cases it can be separated from
the protected material with which it is associated.

Only if they

are rationally relevant to a dominant theme can one consider the
various drawings and slogans on the bed sheets as one integrated
whole.

Kois, 408 U.S. at 231.

In that case, photos illustrating

an article are integral parts of a larger whole.

However,

separate, unrelated articles in a magazine, even a political
magazine, for example, do not form an integrated whole.

Schauer1

points out that a magazine article is intended to be read as a
unit, but articles in the same magazine not necessarily related or
read together should be evaluated separately.

The same is true of

a collage putting together disparate material.
Merrill

United States v.

(9th Cir. 1984), 746 F.2d 458, differentiates such a

collage from one where all aspects are "a fully integrated part of
the whole":
"The playing cards depicting oral sex are merely pasted
onto the rest of the collages. They have no part in the
theme and are not part of the message."
1

F. SCHAUER, The Law of Obscenity, 108-9.
7

A casual examination of the wall hangings in question reveals an
analogous situation. Turner was unable to relate these drawings to
the others in a rational manner (Tr, p.228), and the trial judge
was justified after examination to find them to be "a whole group
of unrelated things . . . juxtaposed nexr T:O one another" (Tr,
p.207) .
C. Separability, Further mandating a separate consideration
of the offensive material is the fact that the remaining material
would not be diminished nor would its message be affected in any
way if the materials in question were excised.
recently

held

expressive

that

total

conduct

of

nudity

could

a dancer

be removed

(by adding

constitutionally suppressing that expression.
Theatre, Inc., 59 L.W. 4745, 4748.

The Supreme Court

pasties)

from

the

without

Barnes v. Glen

The Court refers to United

States v. O'Brien (1968), 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 29
L.Ed.2d 672, where limitations were allowed to be placed even
though "speech11 and
place.

,f

non-speech" elements were present in the same

That reasoning would certainly allow the subject material

to be separated from the rest of Turner's materials for specific
consideration by the trier of fact, barring a more apparent
interrelationship.

The "taken as a whole" requirement has no

application outside the context of an attempt to suppress the
totality of a non-divisible work.
Minneapolis (8th Cir., 1985), 780

Upper Midwest Booksellers v.
F.2d 1389, 1391.

In that case

an ordinance was validated which required an opaque cover on the
front of a book, thus suppressing its content from public view,
8

even though the interior of the book was appropriate "speech11. The
material on Turner's wall hangings similarly lends itself to an
easy, natural division.

Only the effort to tie it all together

under some "dominant theme" is unnatural and contrived.

II.

THE MATERIAL PUBLICLY DISPLAYED BY DEFENDANT IS PATENTLY
OFFENSIVE.
A.

Sexual Conduct. While not artfully done, the displays in

question depict a clearly recognizable female form in recumbent
position with legs spread to expose her genitals, and a close-up
enlargement of a female vulva with dark pubic hair and folds of
pink flesh.

The latter is explicit, and both are lewd within the

definition

of the

St. George

ordinance.

Are they patently

offensive?

The Court of Appeals found them sufficiently abstract

as to permit a variety of non-obscene interpretations (App.A, p. 3) .
That seems to concede availability of one interpretation that would
make them obscene-

The City suggests that any ambiguity in

interpretation is quickly resolved by adjacent inscriptions such as
"Tunnel of Love" (with arrow pointing to the vulva) and "Eat Me".
The renderings are within the "plain examples" given in Miller, and
this Court has referred with approval to a lewd exhibition of the
genitals as constituting patently offensive "sexual conduct" as
required by the Miller test. State v. Haig (Utah, 1978), 578 P.2d
837 at 845, 6 (Maughan, concurring).

Cases following Miller have

not required "explicit" sexual conduct in order to pass

9

constitutional muster.

Citv of Urbana ex rel. Newlin v. Downing

(Ohio, 1939), 539 N.E.2d 140, cert. den. 58 L.W. 3284.
B. Erotic Arousal. It was recognized by Miller and all cases
since that the obscene is not limited to that which is erotic,
contrary to Cohen v. California (1971), 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780,
29 L.Ed.2d

284, cited by the Court of Appeals

(App.A, p.8).

Placing obscenity within contemporary context, it must be observed
that "obscenity is not merely about sex, any more than science
fiction is about science."2

The depictions here may well be

indecent in a disgusting sense and offensive to the senses without
sexually arousing the beholder.

Profession Schauer's treatise,

supra, effectively places the erotic element of obscenity in
perspective at Page 102. Arousal should not be a necessary plank
in the threshold utilized by the trial judge.

III.

ONCE MINIMUM CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION IS PRESENT,
A CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARD IS APPLIED.
A case relied upon heavily by the Court of Appeals in its

decision is Jenkins v. Georgia (1974), 418 U.S. 153, 94

S.Ct.

2750, 41 L.Ed.2d 642, where the Court primarily discussed "patent
offensiveness", the second prong of the Miller test.

It properly

notes that among examples given in Miller of the type of material
falling

within

genitals."

A

that

standard

is a

"lewd

exhibition

of the

It affirms that through the use of such examples,

IRVING KRISTOL, On the Democratic Idea in America 35-56

(1969) .
10

Miller "intended to fix substantive constitutional limitations,
deriving from the First Amendment, on the type of material" that
can properly be considered patently offensive.

(Jenkins, 418 U.S.

at 160).

The material in Jenkins was nudity only, not a genitalic

display.

Focusing on the material in question, the Turner jury

found as a fact that the depictions were patently offensive.

A

verdict based on the contemporary standards of St. George must be
respected unless it fails to meet the minimum Miller standards.
The majority opinion (App.A, p.6) states that the Jenkins
court "substituted its judgment for that of the jury" because the
Miller test was not met. It would be more accurate to characterize
the Jenkins court as determining that the jury's judgment could not
be sustained because it failed to meet the minimum standard of
patent offensiveness.

"To substitute for" implies a right to

second-guess and disagree with the perception of a particular jury
from the community.
An

The Court of Appeals did that in this case.

appellate court should

function

and

only

require

instead exercise a more objective
a verdict

from

the

community

to

successfully meet the measure of a minimum standard, without
interposing its own subjective judgment.

A jury's verdict should

be rejected if it fails to meet the minimum standards.

Meeting

those standards, however, it should not be supplanted just because
it may differ from another's studied perception of the material.
Only by exercising some restraint in the substitution of its own
judgment

can

an

appellate

court

assure

compliance

with

constitutional thresholds and still avoid disabuse of a community
11

right

to

apply

its

contemporary

local

standard•

Objective

application of the Miller criteria will protect constitutional
rights from the whim of a jury, and at the same time it should
prevent unnecessary usurpation of a jury's right to make an
obscenity determination in the context of community standards.
As discussed in detail by the Court in Hamlina v. United
States (1974), 418 U.S.87, 102-107, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590,
Miller changed prior law by emphasizing the need to measure
obscenity with such local criteria. A state body, whether court or
legislature, may

very

appropriately

deal with

constitutional

minimums, but it must delegate to local citizenry the right to
define the standards in their community.

Smith v. United States

(1977), 431 U.S. 291, 300-303, 308, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 52 L.Ed.2d 324.
Application of the necessary minimums should be carefully done so
as to protect the jury's right to find facts in an area where it is
deemed to be expert.

The Appellate Court in the majority opinion

has not applied the Miller test with desired finesse, but rather
has sculpted minimum standards with such heavy hand that the jury's
role has been preempted well beyond the point necessary to afford
constitutional protections.

IV.

WHERE MATERIALS ARE TARGETED AT JUVENILES THE COURT SHOULD
GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THAT FACT.
As the Turner shop was near a high school in a residential

neighborhood, was open only during hours when youth were not in
school, and admittedly drew patrons from the high school (Tr,
12

p. 23 6) , the City has argued it should be given benefit of the doubt
on any application of minimum standards. This is on the rationale
in Ginsberg v. New York (1968), 390 U.S. 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20
L.Ed.2d 195, and later cases, which permit a broader interpretation
of obscenity where the materials are typically made available to
children. The Court of Appeals would deny any consideration of the
age of those viewing the subject material, based on the reasoning
in Erznoznik v. Jacksonville (1975), 422 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268,
45 L.Ed.2d

125

(App.A, .p.4,n.5).

The Appellant!s

obscenity

ordinance does not purport to regulate speech as to time, place,
and manner, as in that case, and it does not address content except
to attack content that is obscene on the basis that it is not
"speech" and thus is not entitled to protection.

Erznoznik

mentions the Ginsberg holding with approval, but it did not deal
with the question of obscenity, rather with the regulation of nonobscene material.

The post-Ginsberg cases which acknowledge the

need for a heightened sensitivity where minors are involved, such
as Erznoznik and State v. Haig, 578 P. 2d at 844, even if dicta, do
not suggest that the Miller test be supplanted with something
different in the case of juveniles. (But see United States v. Dost
(S.D.Cal, 1986), 636 F.S. 828, 831) Instead they seem to recognize
that the measure of First Amendment protection to which children
are entitled may not be quite as great as in the case of a mature,
discerning adult.

The juvenile dimension in Turnerfs business

should not have been rejected as a factor for consideration in the
interpretation and application of minimum standards.
13

A jury is

entitled to examine the manner in which materials are promoted and
disseminated in making determination of whether they are obscene.
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. at 130;

Splawn v. California

(1977), 431 U.S. 595, 598, 97 S.Ct. 1937, 52 L.Ed.2d 606.

CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals reversal of Turner's conviction appears
to misapprehend the fundamental nature of the appropriate inquiry
into legal minimums posed by the Miller test. Moreover, it is not
clear whether it finds the drawings to not be obscene because by
their very nature they fall short of meeting minimum thresholds of
prurient interest and patent offensiveness, or whether the drawings
alone may be obscene but lose that characterization because they
merge into a larger whole which, on balance, does not meet the
thresholds. The sensitive relationship between application of law
by the court and determination of community standards by the jury
has been violated, and the decision of the lower court should be
reinstated.

->/

•RE&ECTFKLLY SUBMITTED,

TLJ^SHUMWAY

\

City Attorney
City of St. George
175 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 634-5800

\
\

Counsel for Appellant
14
December 2, 1991

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four (4) true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to:
Michael P. Zaccheo
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Alan D. Boyack
205 East Tabernacle
P. 0. Box 749
St. George, Utah 84770
postage prepaid in the United States-Tos^l Service on the 2nd day
of December, 1991.
f[\\\
^ \

T. W. SHUMWAY
Counsel for Appellant
City of St. George

15

I
I
'

APPENDIX
A.

Opinion of Appellate Court

16

COVER SHEET
CASE TITLE:
City of St* George,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Brent Allen Turner,
Defendant: and Appellant.

Case No. 890620-CA

PARTIES:
Michael P. Zaccheo
(Argued)
Attorney for Appellant
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Alan B. Boyack
Attorney for Appellant
205 East Tabernacle
P.O. Box 749
St. George, Utah 84770
T. M. Shumway
(Argued)
St. George City Attorney
175 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84770
TRIAL JUDGE:
Honorable David L. Mower
June 6, 1991.

OPINION (For Publication).

This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is
now ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the
circuit court herein be, and the same is, reversed.
Opinion of the Court by REGNAL W. GARFF, Judge;
GREGORY K. ORME, Judge, concurs. NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judge,
dissents by separate opinion.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of June, 1991, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing OPINION was deposited in the
United States mail or personally delivered to each of the above
parties.

Deputy Cleric
TRIAL COURT:

m si.acjL7
JUN^6 1991
^^A^-^IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOoo

Mary T. Noormn
Clerk of tht Court
Utah Court of Appeals

OPINION
(For Publication)

City of St. George,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 890620-CA

Brent Allen Turner,
F I L E D
( J u n e 6, 1 9 9 1 )

Defendant and Appellant.

Fifth Circuit, St. George Department
The Honorable David L. Mower
Attorneys:

Michael P. Zaccheo, Salt Lake City, for Appellant,
Alan B. Boyack, St. George, for Appellant
T. M. Shumway, St. George, for Appellee

Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Orme.
GARFF, Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Brent Allen Turner, appeals his conviction of
displaying an obscene picture depicting sexual conduct in
violation of St. George City Ordinance No. 2-77-2. We reverse.
FACTS
Turner operated a retail business in St. George, Utah,
vending hard rock record albums and T-shirts. Turner's small,
signless store was open during evening hours only. He was
charged with violating the St. George obscenity ordinance for
his display of three painted bed sheets which he used as wall
hangings and which were visible to anyone entering the shop.
Several people made their "artistic" contributions to the
sheets as they hung on the wall. The sheets appear to be a

collage consisting of various drawings and slogans in different
sizes and styles. The paint appears to have been sprayed or
brushed on. The pictures and slogans appear crude and
simplistic. Several factors make some of the slogans and
drawings impossible to discern from the record: the quality of
the photographs in the exhibit, the draping of the sheets, and
the fact that some stereo speakers appear in front of the
sheets in the photographs. The slogans and drawings appear
intended to confront and to offend, and are related to sexual,
political, religious, and social themes. 1 The portion of the
wall hangings that the prosecution claims violates the St.
George ordinance supposedly portrays a woman reclining in a
spread-eagled manner so as to expose her "pubic area,"
represented by three or four black paint spots. The face and
head of the figure could conceivably be that of a dog. Next to
the drawing of the woman is what has been represented to be an
enlarged drawing of a woman's pubic area. Both renditions are
crudely drawn, blurry and indistinct. The quality of the
renderings could best be compared to the graffiti and drawings
frequently found on the walls of a junior high school rest
room.2
Turner was charged with violating St. George City
Obscenity Ordinance No. 2-77-2 §§ 2a(l) and (2). The relevant
portions of this lengthy ordinance are as follows:
No person shall knowingly: (1) Distribute,
display publicly, furnish or provide to
any person any obscene material or
performance.
St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § 2a(l).
defined as

"Obscene" is

1. The slogans include "Nuke My Ass," "Your [sic] Afraid Face
it," "Group Sex," "Total Peace," "Fuck Authority," "Burn the
Dead," "Eat It," "Live-Die Airborne," "Hell House," "Kill for
God," "Run and Hide Death Will Find You!," "Sold Your Soul,"
"White Flys [sic] Will Eat Your Flesh," "The End," "And Unto
You I Dedicate My Heart," and "My Right to The World." The
drawings include a peace symbol, an MX missile, a swastika,
some gravestones, some crosses, some international prohibitive
symbols over the words "life" and "drugs," a smiling face, a
gun, several skulls, some with cross bones, some with full
skeletons, a door, a mushroom cloud, and a moon.
2. The dissent's description of the two drawings gives the
impression one is looking at an explicit medical illustration

any material or performance which, when
taken as a whole and considered in the
context of the contemporary standards of
this community:
(1) Appeals to prurient interest in sex;
(2) Portrays sexual conduct in a patently
offensive manner;
(3) Has no serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § la. The ordinance
provides a lengthy definition of "sexual conduct," the relevant
portion of which is as follows:
(2) Masturbation, excretion, excretory
function or lewd exhibition of the
genitals, including any explicit close-up
representation of a human genital organ or
a spread eagle exposure of female genital
organs.
St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § le (emphasis added).
A jury found Turner guilty. He now appeals his
conviction on the grounds that (1) the obscenity ordinance was
unconstitutional as applied to him, and (2) the ordinance is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

(Footnote 2 continued)
from Grav's Anatomy, or viewing an exact photograph of the area
in question, leaving no room for dispute as to what the
renditions depict. Such is simply not the case. The second
drawing, described in such intimate detail, could just as
easily be viewed as a beetle, a leaf, or a Zulu war shield. Or
it might more closely resemble a fugitive ink blot from the
Rorschach test ("A personality and intelligence test in which a
subject interprets ten standard black or colored inkblot
designs and reveals through his selectivity the manner in which
intellectual and emotional factors are integrated in his
perception of environmental stimuli." Webster's Medical Desk
Dictionary (1986)). Because the drawings were sufficiently
abstract so as to permit a variety of nonobscene
interpretations, and because of the other reasons enumerated
later in this opinion, the judge, as a matter of law, should
have never permitted the issue to go to the jury.

FIRST AMENDMENT
In a case where we are required to weigh important first
amendment values of freedom of speech against a charge of
obscenity based on a statute or ordinance that is properly
limited, we exercise independent review when necessary, and
determine, as a matter of constitutional law, whether the
material is to be protected. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153,
160 (1974). 3
In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the United
States Supreme Court set forth its definition of obscenity.
The standard has been elaborated in subsequent cases, 4 and it
remains the standard for distinguishing between speech, which
is protected by the first amendment of the United States
Constitution, and obscenity, which is not considered speech and
receives no such protection. id. at 23; Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 485 (1957). 5

3. "[T]he First Amendment values applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected by
the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an
independent review of constitutional claims when necessary."
Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160 (quoting Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 25 (1973)). See also, Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 163-64
(Brennan, J. concurring).
4. For example, Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
491 (1985) (elaboration of prurient interest); and Jenkins, 418
U.S. 153 (elaboration of community standards).
5. The prosecution argues that, because the record shop is
near a school and because minors are likely to frequent the
shop, we should apply the lower standard suggested in Erznoznik
v. Citv of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (discussing
content-neutral time, place and manner regulations of speech).
However, the St. George ordinance fails to regulate the time,
place, or manner that sexually explicit material may be
displayed, but instead, it places a content-based restriction
on any display of sexually explicit material. Consequently, we
must apply the stricter test set forth in Miller, 413 U.S. 15.
Additionally, because the shop is unmarked and is only open
evenings, when school is not in session, it does not appear
that minors are especially likely to frequent the shop.

The Miller test is as follows:
The basic guidelines for the trier of
fact must be: (a) whether the average
person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
413 U.S. at 24 (quotations and citations omitted). The Miller
test is basically incorporated into the St. George ordinance,
except that the ordinance defines "sexual conduct" in ways not
specifically mentioned in Miller. Specifically, the St. George
ordinance prohibits the display of "any explicit close-up
representation of . . . a spread eagle exposure of female
genital organs." St. George, Utah, Ord. No. 2-77-2, § le.
However, among the "plain examples" given by the Miller court
as to what a statute or ordinance can define for regulation as
patently offensive sexual conduct was the "lewd exhibition of
the genitals." Miller, 413 U.S. at 25. We find that, insofar
as the definition describes materials that "depict or describe
patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct" and insofar as
that sexual conduct passes muster under the Miller test, which
it must under section 1(a) of the ordinance, the ordinance is
within constitutional limits.6 Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160
(quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 27).
PRURIENT INTEREST AND
PATENTLY OFFENSIVE
The first prong of the Miller analysis requires the trier
of fact to determine whether the "'average person, applying
contemporary community standards' would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest." Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
6. Because we reverse on other grounds, we do not consider
whether the depiction at issue is lewd.

Material that appeals to the prurient interest does not
include "material that provokefs] only normal, healthy sexual
desires." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498
(1985). Rather, it applies to material that provokes "sexual
responses over and beyond those that would be characterized as
normal." i£. Specifically, "prurience may be constitutionally
defined for the purposes of identifying obscenity as that which
appeals to a shameful or morbid interest in sex . . . ." Id.
at 504.
The second prong of the Miller analysis is "whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law."
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
When determining what appeals to the prurient interest
and what is patently offensive, the jury is not allowed
unbridled discretion. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160
(1974). The trial judge has a significant role in defining the
extent of the jury's discretion. "Application of the obscenity
standard involves a subjective element on the part of the
tribunal — judge, jury or both—making the critical
determination." Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 397
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C.
Cir. 1974)). In addition, jury discretion is subject to
independent appellate review, when necessary, and by the
requirement that only depictions of patently offensive hard
core sexual conduct be subject to prosecution. Jenkins, 418
U.S. at 160. Therefore, in Jenkins, the Supreme Court did not
hesitate to invade the province of the jury, which the Georgia
Supreme Court had refused to do. In overturning the verdict,
the Supreme Court ruled that the jury did not have sole
discretion to determine that the film Carnal Knowledge was
obscene, and substituted its judgment for that of the jury
because, it concluded, it was "simply not the 'public portrayal
of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the
ensuing commercial gain' which we said was punishable in
Miller." 418 U.S. at 162 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 35).
Thus, there is a constitutional threshold of "hard-coreness"
that must be met.
Not only must the statute or ordinance be
constitutionally explicit, but the trial court has the
responsibility to make a threshold determination as to whether
a work may depict hard-core sexual conduct. Only after the
court has reached this conclusion is it appropriate to turn the
matter over to the jury to apply the first two prongs of the

Miller test.
correctly made
Jenkins.° The
dismiss, found

Accordingly, we consider whether the trial court
the threshold determination contemplated in
court, in its pretrial order denying a motion to
that "the words and drawing described herein

7. In a recent case, State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7
(1991), the Utah Supreme Court commented on the distinctions
between the overlapping roles of the trial court and the jury.
Even though Ramirez was concerned with the admission of
eyewitness identification, we f:nd the court's comments
appropriate here where the trial court has to make a
preliminary determination of obscenity when that same issue
will have to be redetermined by the jury when the evidence is
considered:
Potential for role confusion and for
erosion of constitutional guarantees
inheres in this overlap of responsibility
of judge and jury to determine the same
issue. Because the jury is not bound by
the judge's preliminary factual
determination made in ruling on
admissibility[/obscenity] the trial court
may be tempted to abdicate its charge as
gatekeeper to carefully scrutinize
proffered evidence for constitutional
defects and may simply admit the evidence,
leaving all questions pertinent to its
reliability[/obscenity] to the jury. But
courts cannot properly sidestep their
responsibility to perform the required
constitutional admissibility[/obscenity]
analysis. To do so would leave protection
of constitutional rights to the whim of a
jury and would abandon the courts'
responsibility to apply the law.
159 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9.
8. "Judges . . . must take care lest they decide these cases
on the basis simply of their indignation and disgust with the
kind of trash presented. The First Amendment extends to trash,
if it stops short of obscenity . . . ." Huffman, 470 F.2d at
396. Even though a piece may be "dismally unpleasant, uncouth
and tawdry," that alone "is not enough to make [it]
•obscene.'" Manual Enter, v. Dav, 370 U.S. 478, 490 (1962).

arguably suggest an act which would constitute a violation of
the ordinance, i.e., an act of oral-genital contact."
While the spray painted drawings depict representations
of genitalia, the drawings are too crudely rendered to be
salacious or titillating or to provoke sexual responses, normal
or healthy, much less those that are "over and beyond those
that would be characterized as normal." Brockett, 472 U.S. at
498. "Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to the
States' broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such
expression must be, in some significant way, erotic." Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). The arresting officer
admitted as much at trial. Even though the drawings are
vulgar, offensive, and confrontational, they are too sketchy
and abstract to appeal "to a shameful or morbid interest in
sex." Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504.9 The trial court's pretrial
finding of an "arguable suggestion" is not sufficient to meet
the constitutional test, and our own review of the evidence
leads us to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, these
renderings are not "public portrayal[s] of hard-core sexual
conduct for its own sake, and for the ensuing commercial
gain." Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 161 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at
35).
Moreover, we cannot judge the drawings in isolation, but
must also consider the written material and other symbols
because Miller requires us to view the collage "taken as a
whole" in determining its appeal to the prurient interest. 413
U.S. at 24. In Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972),10 the
9. "The First Amendment protection for the depiction of nude
women applies even . . . where the pictures focus upon the
pubic areas and poses are struck in such a way as to emphasize
the female genitalia." Huffman, 470 F.2d at 401.
10. Although Kois preceded Miller, Miller frequently cites the
case with approval, indicating an intent to reaffirm the
decision and its analysis. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23, 24, 25, 26,
35, 37. Also, the test in Kois was whether "to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest." Kois, 408 U.S. at 230 (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)). Although this phrase
implies that the Kois phrase "taken as a whole" applies only to
the first part of the Miller test, the crux of Kois was whether
an allegedly obscene depiction had political value. We think
the Kois analysis of "taken as a whole" is helpful in both the
first and third prongs of the Miller test.

Supreme Court considered the context in which an allegedly
obscene work was displayed. Kois involved the publication of a
photograph of an embracing nude couple, similar to one
confiscated by a Wisconsin district attorney. Because the
accompanying article was about the confiscation, the Court held
that the picture was newsworthy and thus protected. Laying a
foundation for what would later be the third prong of the
Miller analysis, the Court held that context could redeem an
otherwise obscene picture, where there is some contextual
relativity between the offending portion and the rest of the
work: "A quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will
not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene publication."
408 U.S. at 231. The Court held that because the picture was
"rationally related" and "relevant to the theme of the
article," it was "clearly entitled" to protection. Id.
Here, the two drawings do not appear as a sham attempt to
insulate obscene material with protected material. That is,
while the two drawings may be more confrontational and vulgar
than what appears on the rest of the bedsheets, they are not
entirely out of context with the other depictions of political,
philosophical, musical, social and sexual themes. Because the
work is a collage, there is not a close relationship among all
the slogans and symbols. However, a close relationship is not
the requirement; a rational relationship is. Kois, 407 U.S. at
231. U
The two drawings meet the Kois test because they
rationally relate to the immediate context (the wall hangings)
and to the broader context (the record store). The immediate
context is a collage of various symbols and phrases. The
broader context is that of a hard rock record store which vends
heavy metal music, which music is intended, in part, to
challenge traditional ideas and modes of thinking.
Therefore, even if we were to concede, which we do not,
that the two key drawings appeal to the prurient interest and
are patently offensive, we cannot see how the entire collage,
taken as a whole, is so.
11. The Kois Court's use of the phrase "rationally related"
suggests a low level of integration between an offending
picture and its larger context. See E. Main, The Neglected
Prong of the Miller Test for Obscenity: Serious Literary.
Artistic. Political, or Scientific Value. 11 S. 111. Univ. L.J.
1159, 1163-64 (1987).

Because we conclude, as a matter of law, that the
drawings themselves do not appeal to the prurient interest and
are not patently offensive, and because the drawings rationally
relate to the rest of the collage, which, taken as a whole, is
not patently offensive and does not appeal to the prurient
interest, we find that the drawings are not in violation of the
St. George ordinance.
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Regnal W. Garff, Judge* /'

I CONCUR:

Gregory^K. Orme, Judge

JACKSON, Judge (dissenting):
INTRODUCTION
I would affirm Mr. Turner's conviction. He was tried by a
jury of his peers and found guilty of violating an ordinance
which specifically defined constitutionally obscene materials.
Mr. Turner was provided fair notice that lewd exhibition of
human genitals to the St. George public, including spread-eagle
exposure of female genital organs, would bring prosecution.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) provides "plain
examples of what a state statute [or city ordinance] could
define [as obscenity] for regulation . . . ." One of Miller's
plain examples of "hard core" sexual conduct is representation
of "lewd exhibition of the genitals." Id. Thus, the trial
judge could reasonably determine that the ordinance contained a
constitutionally proper and specific definition of obscenity
and that Turner's exhibition of the nude spread-eagle female
and a separate enlarged detailed vulva with open vagina,
exposed labia and clitoris was in violation of the
constitutionally valid ordinance. Accordingly, the trial judge
properly submitted the case to the jury for determination after
denying a pretrial motion to dismiss based only on submission
of Turner's drawings and the city ordinance. The jury saw the
materials, heard the evidence and determined that Turner's
materials were obscene and that he had displayed them to
unwarned members of the public in violation of the city
ordinance.*
FACTS
The statement of "facts" in the main opinion reads like a
subjective treatise in art appreciation, assessing the quality
of Turner's art work as "crude," "simplistic," "abstract,"
"indistinct" and "blurry." However, this attack of adjectives
is irrelevant. The Supreme Court has not indicated that
tasteful, mature, high quality obscenity should be suppressed
or that untasteful, immature, low quality obscenity should go
without regulation. On the other hand, the opinion does
recognize that the "indistinct" drawing is in fact "a woman
reclining in a spread-eagled manner (facing the viewer) so as
to expose her pubic area." The opinion also recognizes the
1. Since Turner accepted the jury instructions "as
constituted," no exceptions, I must conclude that the jury was
properly instructed regarding applicable law.

drawing next to the woman as a large depiction of a woman's
pubic area but evaluates it as "blurry." These observations
are highly relevant. This "blurry" drawing (in shades of red
and pink) graphically depicts all of the external female
genitalia. This vulva is surrounded by depictions of pubic
hair done in black. "Genitalia," the word in Miller and the
St. George ordinance, means the reproductive organs, especially
the external sex organs. The American Heritage Dictionary,
Second College Edition 553 (1985). Despite the majority's
protestation in footnote 2 that Turner's depictions might
resemble something else, Turner testified that they were a nude
woman and an enlargement of a "girl's vagina."
Turner's vulva depiction occupies the center of the sheet
(side to side) with the top of the vulva at the center of the
sheet (top to bottom). On the lower half of the sheet, the
left third is occupied by the words of a question with the nude
woman underneath. The question done in black over yellow is:
"Why Not Let
Some One Else
Think For You?"
The upper half of the vulva and pubic hair depiction is
immediately to the right of the three lines in the question.
Between the question and the nude woman is: "Tuna Factory x x
x x" inscribed in a green banner over her head. Between the
nude woman and the vulva is a small sign post with the words
"Tunnel of Love" and a yellow arrow points from the sign to the
lower half of the vulva and pubic hair. Underneath the vulva
and hair are the words "Keep Out" in red. To the right of the
vulva and hair in black are the words:
,r

It 's
Mine
All Mine"
The upper half of the sheet has these slogans across the top
(left to right): "My Right to the World," "Your (sic) Afraid
Face It" and "Live For Yourself" and a round bomb with "Drugs"
inscribed on it. Underneath these items and across the lower
portion of the upper half (left to right) are a skull, a
swastika, a "13," a happy face, and a shield with "AA" on it.
SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The majority disposes of the jury's verdict by virtue of a
"hard core" attack (without defining hard core) and by use

of a "loose" definition of the scope of appellate review in
mounting tne attack. Their opinion, citing Jenkins v. Georgia,
418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974), states that "the jury is not allowed
unbridled discretion" in making its obscenity determination.
Then the majority claims that Jenkins demonstrates that the
appellate court should "not hesitate to invade the province of
the jury" and to "substitute its judgment" for the jury's
judgment because the jury "does not have sole discretion" to
make the obscenity determination. I will first discuss scope
of appellate review and then address the meaning of "hard core"
and the "average person test" in response to the above
posturing of the main opinion. Later in my opinion I will
reach the main opinion's backup position regarding the context
of Turner's work taken "as a whole."
I agree that the jury does not have unbridled discretion
in an obscenity case. But I also note that my appellate
colleagues do not have unbridled discretion on review. Our
function is to restrict both the legal and factual
determinations to the constitutional guidelines set forth in
Miller. Miller states that the elements of obscenity—prurient
interest, patent offensiveness and lack of serious value—are
to be determined by the trier of fact, i.e., the jury. 413
U.S. at 26 & n.9; see also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S.
291, 308 (1977). Further, prurient interest and patent
offensiveness are to be measured by the test of an average
person in the community applying contemporary community
standards, which I will discuss in detail below. Thus, we must
give the jury's findings on those elements a fair measure of
deference, particularly in a close case. That does not mean
that obscenity convictions will be virtually unreviewable.
Smith, 431 U.S. at 305. But, "[d]eterminations of prurient
interest and patent offensiveness, and also, therefore, of
contemporary community standards, are such as to indicate that
the major determination should be made by the jury, except in
the more extreme cases." F. Schauer, The Law of Obscenity at
150-51 (1976)(footnotes omitted)[hereinafter Schauer]. Since
the serious value element is to be measured by a "reasonable
person" standard, this determination is more amenable to
appellate review. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 305.
[I]t is also significant to note the
further indication of this decision
rHamlinq v. United States, 418 U.S. 87
(1974)] that although all of the elements
of the Supreme Court's obscenity tests
have a constitutional basis, only the

[serious] value standard is really a
question of fundamental constitutional
rights. The other tests are mainly
questions of fact requiring a less rigid
standard of review.
Schauer at 125 (emphasis added).
Because the majority fails to recognize the proper scope of
appellate review, it answers the wrong question. Thus, the
analysis quickly adopts a finding that Turner's "renderings are
not public portrayals of hard core sexual conduct", i.e., the
renderings are not obscene. Our function is not to answer the
question of whether Turner's materials are obscene--as the
majority has done. Our function is to answer the question of
whether Turner's materials created a jury question as to
obscenity--as the majority has not done.
The appellate court should review each Miller element and
determine as to that element whether a jury issue has been
created. Instead, the majority disposes of the jury's obscenity
verdict by exercise of their own "hard core" judgment.
A.

The "Hard Core" Judgment

In Huffman, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit correctly observed that prior to 1971, the United States
Supreme Court had not defined the term "hard core"
pornography.2 Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 393 n.9
(1971) rev'd, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court
did not define "hard core" until 1973 in Mi Her which set forth
specific examples. If material which has failed to pass the
Miller tests for obscenity looks like something different than
Miller's examples, then the jury or trial judge has erred in
application of at least one of the tests. Schauer at 113. The
main opinion relies on Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 162
(1974) as the basis of its obscenity determination, holding that
Turner's drawings do not depict "hard core" sexual conduct. But

2. The main opinion relies on Huffman, a pre-Miller and
pre-Jenkins circuit case for language to support its "hard core"
pornography argument. See nn. 7 & 8. Further, the opinion
utilizes Huffman to support its scope of review position.

the opinion fails to examine the meaning of "hard core."J Thus,
before examining our case in the light of Jenkins, I turn to
Miller for the definitive meaning of "hard core."
Miller states "for the first time since Roth lv. United
States, 354 U.S. 476] was decided in 1957, a majority of this
Court has agreed on concrete guidelines to isolate 'hard core'
pornography from expression protected by the First Amendment."
Miller, 413 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added). The Miller guidelines
include concrete examples of "hard core" materials. One of
those examples is "lewd exhibition of the genitals." III. at
25. This example isolates as "hard core" the very materials
described in the St. George ordinance and exhibited by Turner.
His depictions and descriptions consist of genital imagery and
sexual conduct. Since Miller, the depiction of sexual conduct
does not necessarily require motion or activity.
Jenkins
3. Miller states that under its holding "no one will be subject
to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive
•hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the
regulating state law. . . ." Miller, 413 U.S. at 27. "Depict"
means to present a lifelike image of. Roqet's II, The New
Thesaurus 246 (1980). "Describe" means to give a verbal account
of. Iji. at 250. Thus, "hard core" sexual conduct can be
presented in images or words.
4.

Professor Schauer has stated:
In 1973, however, the Supreme Court
specifically stated that only the
depiction of "hard-core" sexual conduct
may be prohibited. As examples of what
might be included, the Court indicated the
following:
(a) Patently offensive
representations or descriptions of
ultimate sexual acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive
representations or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions,
and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
This definition seems to make it clear
that hard-core pornography may include
things other than actual sexual congress
or activity, contrary to the views of a

states that "we made it plain that under that holdinc fMillerl
'no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure
of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe
patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct . . . . '"
Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added)(auotinq Miller, 413
U.S. at 27).
Jenkins reiterates the following definitions of "hard core"
as first set forth in Miller:
We also took pains in Mi Her to
"give a few plain examples of what a state
statute could define for regulation under
part (b) of the standard announced," that
is, the requirement of patent
offensiveness. Id., at 25, 93 S.Ct., at
2615. These examples include
"representations or descriptions of
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted,
actual or simulated," and "representations
or descriptions of masturbation, excretory
functions, and lewd exhibition of the
genitals." Ibid. While this did not
purport to be an exhaustive catalog of
what juries might find patently offensive,
it was certainly intended to fix
substantive constitutional limitations,
deriving from the First Amendment, on the
type of material subject to such a
determination. It would be wholly at odds
with this aspect of Miller to uphold an
obscenity conviction based upon a
defendant's depiction of a woman with a
bare midriff, even though a properly
charged jury unanimously agreed on a
verdict of guilty.
(Footnote 4 continued)
number of other courts prior to Miller.
These views seemed based primarily on the
Redrup fv. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967)]
reversals of the Supreme Court, since for
a number of years after 1967 the Court
reversed any obscenity conviction where
the material did not display actual sexual
activity, regardless of the lewd or
suggestive poses of individual models.
Schauer at 111.

Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160-61 (emphasis added). Jenkins was a
"bare midriff" case. Our case is not. Miller does not mention
bare midriffs or mere nudity. Miller specifically defines lewd
exhibition of the "genitals." This is our case. In Jenkins
the Supreme Court viewed the film Carnal Knowledce and observed:
While the subject matter of the picture
is, in a broader sense, sex, and there are
scenes in which sexual conduct including
"ultimate sexual acts" is to be understood
to be taking place, the camera does not
focus on the bodies of the actors at such
times. There is no exhibition whatever of
the actors' genitals, lewd or otherwise,
during these scenes. There are occasional
scenes of nudity, but nudity alone is not
enough to make material legally obscene
under the Miller standards.
Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
Having observed that the film depicted "nudity" only and
not "genitals", the Supreme Court held that "the film could
not, as a matter of constitutional law, be found to depict
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way. . . . "
I_d. at
161. Jenkins and Miller both tell us what can be defined as
"hard core," i.e., lewd exhibition of the genitals. Jenkins
tells us one thing that can not be considered "hard core,"
i.e., a bare midriff. Jenkins simply does not grant my
colleagues discretion on review to hold as a matter of
constitutional law that Turner's depictions and exhibition of
female genitalia were clearly not obscene and did not create an
issue for the jury. To the contrary, Jenkins and Miller stand
for the proposition that St. George could define, and prohibit
as "hard core" obscenity, the lewd exhibition of the
genitals—even if only by "representation." Miller, 413 U.S.
at 25. The St. George ordinance adopted the Miller
definition. Professor Schauer has stated:
But now, after Miller, it is clear that
hard-core pornography may include material
which does not depict sexual acts, and
"lewd exhibition of the genitals" is
specifically included. This should be
interpreted in the light of a number of
lower court cases defining hard-core
pornography to include photographs which
focus on, exaggerate, or emphasize the

genitalia or "erogenous zones." It is
this exaggeration or "highlight" on the
genitalia which often distinguishes
hard-core pornography from mere nudity.
Schauer at 111-112.
Turner elected to exhibit materials which highlight and
amplify female genitalia, one of Miller's specific examples of
"hard core." In fact, Turner described the vulva drawing as:
"It's supposed to be a very-enlarged portion of the girl's
pubic area" and the "tunnel of love" represents "a girl's
vagina." Turner's depictions are a form of hard core
pornography well within the types of permissibly proscribed
depictions set forth in Miller and the St. George ordinance.
Accordingly, Turner's materials were sufficient to clearly
present a jury issue as to obscenity. As promised, I now turn
to further consideration of the average person test because the
majority has not given proper deference to this test and has
substituted their own personal judgments for that of the jury.
B.

The Average Person Test

1. Test Applies to Prurient Interest and Patently Offensive
Elements
In 1957, Roth replaced the "most susceptible" person test
of obscenity with the "average person" test. Miller reaffirmed
this test by reciting Roth:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact
must be: (a) whether "the average person,
applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).
The Miller Court rejected a national "community standard"
as an exercise in futility. In so doing, the Court relied on
the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184 (1964) which stated:
It is neither realistic nor
constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of
Maine or Mississippi accepc public

depiction of conduct found tolerable in
Las Vegas, or New York City. People in
different States vary in their tastes and
attitudes, and this diversity is not to be
strangled by the absolutism of imposed
uniformity.
Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 200 (citations omitted).
In accord with the above rationale, the Miller Court held
"that obscenity is to be determined by applying 'contemporary
community standards', 'not national standards'." Miller, 413
U.S. at 31-32. Miller analyzed this new standard in relation
to both the prurient interest and the patent offensiveness
tests. Both of those tests require a less rigid standard of
review because they are principally questions of fact. The
jurors are to apply this standard as would the average person
in their community. Accordingly, the jurors' analytical
process is as follows: (1) determine, from their own knowledge
of the community, the sense of the average person in the
community; (2) determine from their own knowledge of the
community contemporary community standards; (3) apply those
standards to the work in question and make judgments regarding
appeal to the prurient interest and patent offensiveness. If
these judgments by the jury are in the affirmative, the work is
obscene. If either of these judgments is in the negative, the
work is not obscene. Thus, only the serious value element of
Miller presents a question regarding fundamental constitutional
rights. S_e£, e.g., Schauer at 125. If the work is obscene,
the jury then determines whether it has serious value which
would save it. This is done by applying the reasonable person
test. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
2.

The Average Person

Who is the mysterious average person? He or she is
neither the most immune nor the most susceptible. "[Ojbscenity
is to be judged according to the average person in the
community, rather than the most prudish or the most tolerant."
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 304 (1977). The Miller
opinion stated the primary concern in requiring a jury to apply
this standard is that the material "will be judged by its
impact on an average person, rather than a particularly
susceptible or sensitive person—or indeed a totally
insensitive one." Miller, 413 U.S. at 33. I note the
continuing emphasis that it is the individual juror who must
divine the standards of the average person in the local

community. Because this factual judgment is to be exercised by
the peer juror, the prosecution need not produce "expert"
witnesses to testify as to obscenity. Kaplan v. California,
413 U.S. 115, 121-22 (1973). The juror knows as well as any
expert who the average person is and what the contemporary
community standards are. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973). The Supreme Court has stated:
A juror is entitled to draw on his own
knowledge of the views of the average
person in the community or vicinage from
which he comes for making the required
determination, just as he is entitled to
draw on his knowledge of the propensities
of a "reasonable" person in other areas of
the law.
Hamlinq v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974), quoted in
Smith, 431 U.S. at 302.
This standard requires each juror to tap his or her
knowledge of his or her community in deciding what obscenity
conclusion the average person in the community, applying
contemporary community standards, would reach in a particular
case. Thus, the appellate judge has a formidable, if not
impossible task, in second guessing the juror's personal draw
on his or her "knowledge of the community." How does the
appellate judge divine the sense of the average person in a
distant community where the appellate judge does not reside or
has little, if any, personal knowledge of community mores on
which to draw? Expert witnesses? Not required. " [I]n 'the
cases in which this Court has decided obscenity questions since
Roth, it has regarded the materials as sufficient in themselves
for the determination of the question.'" Kaplan, 413 U.S. at
122 (quoting Ginzburq v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 465
(1966)). How about the local statute? Introduced here.
Helpful evidence, but not conclusive. H[T]he local statute on
obscenity provides relevant evidence of the mores of the
community whose legislative body enacted the law." Smith, 431
U.S. at 308. Smith held, as did Miller, that the issues of
prurient interest and patent offensiveness "are fact questions
for the jury, to be judged in the light of the jurors'
understanding of contemporary community standards." !£. at
300-01. Thus, we see that the jury is uniquely qualified to
exercise this particular judgment, i.e., the average person
applying contemporary community standards. They must "consider
the entire community and not simply their own subjective
reactions or the reactions, of a sensitive or of a callous

minority." I_d. at 305. And in this case, my appellate
colleagues have little evidence of local community standards
other than the juror's judgment which has been exercised.5
Here, the basic evidence of community mores was each juror's
personal knowledge of local standards and the St. George
ordinance. The St. George ordinance contains the Miller
definitions of hard core obscenity. The ordinance is
substantial evidence of a community standard that genitalia
will not be lewdly depicted and displayed to the public.
Turner elected to exhibit genitalia, as proscribed, to the
unwarned members of the public including juveniles who entered
his place of business. His public exhibition of hard core
materials created questions for the jury regarding prurient
interest and patent offensiveness. The jury applied the
"average person" test under contemporary community standards
and found in the affirmative. Again, the majority has not
definitively answered the question of whether a jury question
had been created on these issues. Instead, the majority,
without acknowledging the "average person" test simply
substitutes their individual judgments for the judgments
exercised by the jury and summarily announce their own factual
findings (dressed up as conclusions of law) in the negative
stating:
Because we conclude . . . that the
drawings themselves do not appeal to the
prurient interest and are not patently
offensive and because the drawings
rationally relate to the rest of the
collage . . . taken as a whole . . . we
find the drawings are not in violation of
the St. George Ordinance.
TURNER'S WORK "AS A WHOLE"
Since the majority concluded that Turner's work failed the
"hard core" requirement, that should have been the end of the
5. The defense called four witnesses ostensibly to testify
regarding community standards. One had purchased some "mens'"
magazines at some convenience stores in Washington County.
Another had seen "R" rated movies in St. George, including Sea
of Love and Skin Deep, but no "X" rated movies. One indicated
that there were literary works available in Southern Utah which
contained the "F" word, and the last described the place of
nudes in 20th century art. None testified as "experts" nor
stated "expert opinions" regarding community standards.

opinion, as in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) on which
they rely. Nevertheless, the opinion tries to further save the
work from the jury's obscenity determination by analyzing
Turner's work "as a whole."'6
A.

Context or Unit of Perception

Obscenity cases have dealt with a book, a movie, a
magazine article, a cartoon, a brochure, each as a unit of
perception.
What material displayed by Turner is the logical
6. The majority tries to save Turner's work from the jury's
obscenity determination by relying completely on the curious
per curiam case of Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972) for
its "as a whole" analysis. I observe some problems with this
reliance on Kois.
First, Kois was a pre-Miller case. Kois is divided into
two sections using different analyses to dispose of two
separate criminal offenses: (1) an underground newspaper
article which included a photo of a nude couple embracing and
(2) a book of poems which included a poem describing sexual
intercourse.
Second, since Kois was a pre-Miller, "national" community
standards case, the Supreme Court's scope of review was broader
than it would be post-Miller, applying "local" community
standards.
Third, Miller requires a different analytical approach
than was applied in the sex poem section of Kois. There, the
Court looked at the "artistic" value of the poem in question
and considered it to be in the realm of "serious art." From
that premise, the Court decided the dominant theme of the poem
did not appeal to the prurient interest. Under Miller "serious
value" of the work is examined last and only after the work has
failed the prurient interest and patent offensiveness tests.
If so, "serious value" is examined to determine if the work has
value which can save it.
7. The trial judge, the jurors and the appellate judges should
observe the complete "work" as a unit of perception. See
generally Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973) (book);
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (movie); Penthouse
Intern., Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 447 U.S. 931 (1980) (magazine); Papish v. Board of
Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973)(per curiam)(political cartoon);
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1984) (advertising
brochure).

unit of perception? The prosecution offered two separate
sheets as units of perception each depicting offensive
material. Turner testified that one of the sheets which
contained, among other slogans and depictions, the words "Group
Sex" and "Eat It, Eat Me" was prepared four years earlier as
part of a Halloween motif. Accordingly, it did not bear any
time relation or context relation to the other sheet depicting
the nude and vulva. Further, Turner's counsel argued to the
trial court that the two sheets were "totally" separate and
different works. The main opinion disregards Turner's view and
identifies Turner's "hard rock record store," including the
"collage" of wall hangings, as the unit of perception. I agree
with Turner and his counsel that the logical unit of perception
is to view each of Turner's sheets as separate "paintings" or
works. Turner's painting (sheet depicting the nude female and
vulva), described in detail in my "facts" section above, is the
work or unit of perception at issue in this case. Thus, the
single sheet is the "work" to be "taken as a whole" in the
analysis.
B.

Dominant Theme

The question to be asked by trial judge, jury and
appellate judge is:
whether the objectionable materials are
related to text or other materials which
are themselves constitutionally protected,
or whether the text [or other materials
are] merely asserted as a sham to attempt
to shield commercial pornography in a
cloak of legitimacy.
Schauer at 106.
Turner was unable to articulate any text or theme for the
materials on his painting exclusive of the nude and vulva. His
testimony reveals that he had no clear theme. He was not sure,
but he believed his painting "resembles political commentary."
Even Turner's brief concedes that the theme of his "bed sheets
is admittedly difficult to identify precisely." Thus, the
jury, applying the "average person test" could reasonably
conclude that the objectionable sexual depictions and
descriptions could not possibly relate to the other materials
on the sheet because they were themeless, i.e., a diverse
collection of ideas. Further, even if the other materials set
forth a clear "political" theme, the jury could reasonably
conclude that the "sexual" materials had nothing to do with
politics. Moreover, since Turner testified that the two sexual

depictions were the first materia Is placed on the sheets (and
the other materials added later h ad no theme or were not
related, if they had a theme), th e jury could have reasonably
concluded that the materials adde d to the top of the sheet were
indeed a sham attempt by Turner t o insulate or shield obscene
material (the lower half of the s heet) with non-obscene
material. Turner could not ident ify a dominant theme.8 Since
he could not, the jury had a basi s on which to conclude that
Turner's "themeless" materials we re merely a sham attempt to
insulate his "objectionable" mate rials.

Norman H. Jackson,^uudge
8. The majority creates a "rational relationship" among
Turner's diverse "political, philosophical, musical, social and
sexual themes" by calling his work a collage. Thus, several
entirely unrelated themes are made the "dominant theme" of the
majority with the store as the "context." Accordingly, the
offensive depictions, as part of the collage, in this large
context, are simply meaningless, i.e., not obscene.
This would occur, for example, if the most
obscene items conceivable were inserted
between each of the books of the Bible.
But under existing law, the judges and
juries are able to identify shams in which
non-obscene material is used as a vehicle
to insulate obscene material. As
established in Ginzbura, the "taken as a
whole" test is not quantitative. Under
Miller, even one obscene item contained in
a work would be sufficient to support a
finding that the entire publication is
obscene if, "taken as a whole," the
publication lacks serious value. The
"taken as a whole" test is not
inconsistent with the recognition of shams.
Penthouse Intern., Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1368 (5th
Cir. 1980)(footnote omitted).

